## Brokerage

## Steve Borgatti

## Structural Holes

- Basic idea: Lack of ties among alters may benefit ego
- Benefits
- Autonomy
- Control
- Information


## Autonomy



## Control Benefits of Structural Holes

White House Diary Data, Carter Presidency


Year 1


Data courtesy of Michael Link
Year 4

## Information \& Success



## Changes Made

- Cross-staffed new internal projects
- white papers, database development
- Established cross-selling sales goals
- managers accountable for selling projects with both kinds of expertise
- New communication vehicles
- project tracking db; weekly email update
- Personnel changes


## 9 Months Later



Cross, Parker, \& Borgatti, 2002. Making Invisible Work Visible. California Management Review. 44(2): 25-46

## Burt's Measures of Structural Holes

- Effective Size
- Constraint


## Effective Size

$m_{j q}=j$ 's interaction with $q$ divided by $j$ 's strongest relationship with anyone $p_{i q}=$ proportion of i's energy invested in relationship with q

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
E S_{i}=\sum_{j}\left[1-\sum_{q} p_{i q} m_{j q}\right], & q \neq i, j \\
E S_{i}=\sum_{j} 1-\sum_{j} \sum_{q} p_{i q} m_{j q}, & q \neq i, j
\end{array}
$$

- Effective size is network size (N) minus redundancy in network


## Effective Size in 1/0 Data

- $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{jq}}=\mathrm{i}$ 's interaction with q divided by j 's strongest tie with anyone
- So this is always 1 if $j$ has tie to $q$ and 0 otherwise
- $P_{i q}=$ proportion of i's energy invested in relationship with $q$
- So this is a constant $1 / \mathrm{N}$ where N is ego's network size

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E S_{i}=\sum_{j}\left[1-\sum_{q} p_{i q} m_{j q}\right], \quad q \neq i, j \\
& E S_{i}=\sum_{j}\left[1-\frac{1}{n} \sum_{q} m_{j q}\right], \quad q \neq i, j \\
& E S_{i}=\sum_{j} 1-\sum_{j} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{q} m_{j q}, \quad q \neq i, j \\
& E S_{i}=n-\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j} \sum_{q} m_{j q}, q \neq i, j
\end{aligned}
$$

## Constraint

$\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{jq}}=\mathrm{i}$ 's interaction with q divided by j 's strongest relationship with anyone So this is always 1 if $j$ has tie to $q$ and 0 otherwise
$P_{i q}=$ proportion of i's energy invested in relationship with $q$ So this is a constant $1 / \mathrm{N}$ where N is network size

$$
c_{i j}=p_{i j}-\sum_{q} p_{i q} m_{q j}, \quad q \neq i, j
$$

- Alter j constrains i to the extent that
- $i$ has invested in $j$
- i has invested in people (q) who have invested heavily in $j$. That is, i's investment in $q$ leads back to $j$.
- Even if i withdraws from j , everyone else in i's network is still invested in j


## Constraint



- On left, node 2 is more constrained than 1 and 5
- On right, node 2 is less constrained than 1 and 5


## Approaches to Social Capital

- Topological (shape-based)
- Burt
- Coleman
- Connectionist (attribute-based)
- Lin


## Brokerage Roles



- Gould \& Fernandez
- Broker is middle node of directed triad
- What if nodes belong to different organizations?


Coordinator

## Brokerage Roles




Liaison


- We can count how often a node enacts each kind of brokerage role


## Counting of Role Structures

|  | Coordinator | Gatekeeper | Representative | Consultant | Liaison | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| HOLLY | 0 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 14 |
| BRAZEY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CAROL | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| PAM | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| PAT | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| JENNIE | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| PAULINE | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| ANN | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| MICHAEL | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| BILL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LEE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DON | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| JOHN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| HARRY | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| GERY | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| STEVE | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| BERT | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |  |
| RUSS | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |

## Another Example

|  | Coord | Gate | Rep | Cons | Liais | Total |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| JB | 3 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 24 |
| TB | 0 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 14 |
| MC | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| CC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| BD | 1 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 41 |
| TD | 5 | 5 | 45 | 8 | 25 | 88 |
| PD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| JF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| KG | 7 | 22 | 9 | 0 | 15 | 53 |
| SM | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| BS | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| AS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| JT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PW | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| CW | 0 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 14 |
| TW | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 18 | 86 | 95 | 15 | 58 | 272 |

## Role Profiles

Observed



## E-I Index

- Krackhardt and Stern

$$
\frac{E-I}{E+I}
$$

- $E$ is number of ties between groups, $I$ is number of ties within groups
- Varies between -1 (homophily) and +1 (heterophily)


## E-I Index

|  | Internal | External | Total | E-I |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HOLLY | 3 | 2 | 5 | -0.20 |
| BRAZEY | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| CAROL | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| PAM | 4 | 1 | 5 | -0.60 |
| PAT | 3 | 1 | 4 | -0.50 |
| JENNIE | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| PAULINE | 4 | 1 | 5 | -0.60 |
| ANN | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| MICHAEL | 4 | 1 | 5 | -0.60 |
| BILL | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| LEE | 3 | 0 | 3 | -1.00 |
| DON | 4 | 0 | 4 | -1.00 |
| JOHN | 2 | 1 | 3 | -0.33 |
| HARRY | 4 | 0 | 4 | -1.00 |
| GERY | 3 | 1 | 4 | -0.50 |
| STEVE | 5 | 0 | 5 | -1.00 |
| BERT | 4 | 0 | 4 | -1.00 |
| RUSS | 4 | 0 | 4 | -1.00 |

## Density Tables

- Number of ties from one group to another, as a proportion of the number possible

|  | Division <br> 1 | Division <br> 2 | Division 3 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Division } \\ 4 \end{gathered}$ | Division <br> 5 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Division } \\ 6 \end{gathered}$ | Division 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Division } \\ 8 \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Division 1 |  | 5\% | 11\% | 2\% | 6\% | 7\% | 1\% | 10\% |
| Division 2 | 5\% |  | 18\% | 11\% | 7\% | 2\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Division 3 | 11\% | 18\% |  | 21\% | 12\% | 13\% | 16\% | 9\% |
| Division 4 | 2\% | 11\% | 21\% |  | 6\% | 7\% | 6\% | 6\% |
| Division 5 | 6\% | 7\% | 12\% | 6\% |  | 2\% | 8\% | 3\% |
| Division 6 | 7\% | 2\% | 13\% | 7\% | 2\% |  | 2\% | 10\% |
| Division 7 | 1\% | 3\% | 16\% | 6\% | 8\% | 2\% |  | 0\% |
| Division 8 | 10\% | 2\% | 9\% | 6\% | 3\% | 10\% | 0\% |  |
| Avg. | 6.0\% | 6.8\% | 14.3\% | 8.4\% | 6.3\% | 6.1\% | 5.1\% | 5.7\% |

