

Knowledge & Networks: A Research Agenda

Steve Borgatti Dept. of Organization Studies Boston College





Knowledge is social.

(end of seminar?)

Recent research on knowledge

Communities of Practice

- Much knowledge is tacit
- Knowledge embedded in practice & routines
- Highly situated in contexts
- Learned through participation: apprenticeship

Transactional memory

- Knowledge distributed across different heads
- Exploiting organization's knowledge requires knowing who knows what



There are implications at two levels:

- Factors that determine who interacts with whom will affect what knowledge is created and who knows what
 - What determines who interacts with whom?
- Structure of a network affects what knowledge exists, who has it & how accessible it is
 - Shape of the network: Cliques? Random?
 - Distribution of centrality: Some key players?

Macro

Propinquity

 People tend to interact with those who are physically proximate



From research by Tom Allen

Homophily

Who do you discuss important matters with?

				White	Black	Hisp	Other
	Male	Female	White	3806	29	30	20
[Black	40	283	4	3
Male	1245	748	Hisp	66	6	120	1
Female	970	1515	Other	21	5	3	34

	Age	< 30	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
	< 30	567	186	183	155	56
	30 - 39	191	501	171	128	106
	40 - 49	88	170	246	84	70
ions. Social Networks	50 - 59	84	100	121	210	108
	60 +	34	127	138	212	387

Source:

Marsden, P.V. 19 confiding relati 10: 57-76.



Homophily is self-perpetuating

 Interaction → shared knowledge → more interaction
 People get locked into "network cages"



E-I Index

 We can measure the relative homophily of a group using the E-I index

$$\frac{E-I}{E+I}$$

- E is number of ties between groups (External)
- I is number of ties within groups (Internal)
- Index is positive when a group is outward looking, and negative when it is inward looking
 - E-I index is often negative for close affective relations, even though most possible partners are outside a person's group



The Optimal or Heterophilous Organization



Krackhardt & Stern Experiment

- MBA class divided into two independent organizations
 - Each subdivided into 4 departments, with some interdependencies
- Measure of overall performance
 - financial performance, efficiency, human resource metrics
- Staffing controlled by the experimenter
 - "natural org" placed friends together within departments
 - "optimal org" separated friends as much as possible (high E-I value)
- As game unfoled, the experimenter introduced organizational crises, such as imposing layoffs

Krackhardt, D. & Stern, R.1988. Informal networks and organizational crises. Social Psychology Quarterly 51(2): 123-140

Experimental Results



6 trials at 3 universities. Results shown for most dramatic trial.

Why?

- In crises, organizations need to share information and solve problems across departments
- With positive E-I index, we see joint problemsolving and information sharing
- With negative E-I index, we see blaming, information hoarding
- Therefore, performance is better in orgs with positive E-I index

What else does knowledge sharing interaction depend on?

- Does A know what B's area of expertise is?
- Does A have good impression of B's knowledge?
- Does A have access to B?
- Does A feel the costs of approaching B are too high?

Borgatti, S.P. and Cross, R. 2003. A Social Network View of Organizational Learning. *Management Science*. 49(4): 432-445.







Knowing what they know about





Tailored Interventions when the problem is ...

- Knowing (people don't know much about each other)
 - knowledge fairs, intermediation or skill profiling systems
- Valuing (people have poor reputations or low levels of knowledge)
 - skill training programs, job restructuring
- Access (people cannot easily interact)
 - co-location, peer feedback, recognition/bonuses or technologies.
- Security (not safe to admit ignorance)
 - peer feedback, face to face contact, cultural interventions.

Predicting the future

- If we know what the factors are that need to be in place before A will seek advice from B (e.g., knowing what B's area is, having access, etc.), then
 - We can make a map that puts a line between any pair of persons who have all the right conditions for seeking advice from each other
 - In short, a map of potential advice seeking
 - In effect, predict the eventual pattern of information flow

Potential vs actual information seeking



Potential information seeking (based on regression of information seeking on relational conditions)



The structure of networks of interaction must affect the diversity and distribution and exploitability of knowledge



Clique networks

- Knowledge hoarding
- Global diversity,
 local homogeneity
- Radical innovation



"I would never have conceived my theory, let alone have made a great effort to verify it, if I had been more familiar with major developments in physics that were taking place. Moreover, my initial ignorance of the powerful, false objections that were raised against my ideas protected those ideas from being nipped in the bud."

- Michael Polanyi (1963), on his contribution to physics

Krackhardt Viscosity Simulation

- When adoption of innovation is governed by friends' adoption
 - Then is better to concentrate initial adopters rather than intermingle with general pop but not too much!





Low	Medium	High
Migration	Migration	Migration
Only local cluster adopts – not enough movement to support global adoption	Global adoption occurs – innovation spreads to all clusters	Status quo wins – innovation dies out everywhere

Core/Periphery Structures

- Sharing best practices
 - Group identity
 - Groupthink?
- Efficient coordination
- Central homogeneity peripheral diversity



- But core are gatekeepers of innovation

Diffuse Structures

- Global homogeneity local diversity
- Knowledge sharing
- Incremental innovation
- Individual creativity



Recombination \rightarrow Innovation



Growth in human technological innovation. (Lenski & Lenski) Growth in the number of combinations as a function of number of elements March's (1991) simulation examined organizational learning as a function of learning rates, turnover, environmental turbulence, etc. Simulation uses vector with values {-1, +1} to represent reality (a series of true/false propositions). Individuals consist of vector of beliefs {-1,0,+1} where value of 0 means no opinion yet. The "organization code" is like a super-individual with beliefs {-1,0,+1}.

Individuals learn only from the organizational code (w/ probability p1) and the code learns from individuals smarter than itself (w/ prob p2), where smartness is determined by correlation with the reality vector.

Organizational code is a convenient fiction that ignores actual processes of individuals learning from each other. What is the cost of ignoring these interactive processes? Are the results in any way artifactual as a result?

Use of a single org code precludes modeling of subcultures. Do the results hold when multiple cultures exist?

Use of the organizational code precludes investigation into how structure of communication network affects org learning performance. E.g., do centralized networks learn better? Also prevents investigation into how the distribution of knowledge across network positions affects org learning performance, not to mention individual performance. Individuals learn from those in their network neighborhoods smarter than themselves (w/ probability p1). Networks can be empirically measured or simulated with varying structural characteristics, such as density and shape. Each of March's results is tested using simulated networks in which nodes are connected at random with each other with varying levels of density (no. of ties in network). Most results hold up, but one is strongly contradicted.



We consider diffuse (random) networks versus clumpy networks.





Results show that, under stable conditions, clumpy networks outperform diffuse networks by retaining pockets of diversity.



However, when there is turnover, diffuse networks slightly outperform clumpy ones, presumably because they spread information better.



Diversity of Inputs

- Network size
 - More ties = more diversity
- Weak ties
 - More weak ties = more diversity (because they are less homophilous)
- Betweenness (struct. holes)
 - More non-redundant ties = more diversity
- Alter heterogeneity
 - Alters are heterogeneous with respect to demographics, attitudes, experiences, etc.

Key Players

Presence of a few individuals with very high connectivity makes networks searchable

Physicists call

this "scale-free"

- Particularly if key players are highly visible



Another consequence of reputational and prestige systems?

Summary

If we are interested in what knowledge is created and how it is distributed, we should be interested in social networks At the micro level, social relationships control knowledge sharing & co-creation - Central people more knowledgeable - High betweenness \rightarrow more creative At macro level, structure of soci networks affects types of inn Blah blah

A look ahead

- Combining cognitive with structural models
- Dynamic flows of knowledge over time





Example: Distribution-of-Information Theory



The Fundamental Questions

- Quality
 - What kind of knowledge does a person have?
- Quantity
 - How much knowledge does a person have?